), we will focus our attention to the handling of unsealed sources produced, with particular regard to the operating procedures. The final part will be dedicated to intervention in exceptional operating conditions (entring the bunker due to a machine failure, breaking of a vial during transfer from the hot cell to the transport container and accidental contamination by an operator). Several measures in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency have in common the aim of protecting human life and health, among these to save lives; to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects; to provide fist aid, critical medical treatment and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries; to reduce the risk of stochastic effects. In the phase of the urgent response (the first hours or few days from the declaration of the emergency) mitigatory actions have to be taken by the operating personnel of a nuclear facility to prevent the escalation of the emergency and mitigate the consequences of radioactive releases and exposure; along with these, urgent protective actions have to be implemented. Examples of urgent protective actions are sheltering, evacuation of people residing near the plant and iodine thyroid blocking (ITB) these actions can be also precautionary if taken before or immediately after the beginning of the radioactive release. In the second phase of the emergency (the early rective releases and exposure; along with these, urgent protective actions have to be implemented. SU6656 order Examples of urgent protective actions are sheltering, evacuation of people residing near the plant and iodine thyroid blocking (ITB) these actions can be also precautionary if taken before or immediately after the beginning of the radioactive release. In the second phase of the emergency (the early response phase) which can last days or weeks, early protective actions, like relocation, restrictions on the food chain and on water supply etc., should be taken. The mitigatory and protective actions should be part of a general protective strategy of the population, based on generic criteria and generic guidance values for restricting exposure of the emergency workers and of the general population. The radiological risk assessment and the definition of the radioprotection physical surveillance program applied to a 250 kW (thermal power) research nuclear reactor operated by a large Italian public body. Useful elements for the prevention of personnel exposures, classification criteria for workers, risk reduction methods and optimization of exposures, most common criticalities in plant activities. Analysis of the main operations related to the activities of irradiation and scientific research with an eye to the needs of researchers and one to the indications of prevention. Consolidated intervention methods for ordinary activities and for emergency situations. Detailed examination of the possible unforeseen events or accidents initiators, stopping the assessment at the definition of the source terms related to emergencies inside the plant. Nuclear and conventional causes of accidents and analysis of the radiological consequences. Indications for in-depth-defense and long-term monitoring of the safety of wh-defense and long-term monitoring of the safety of workers, individuals of population and the environment. Less than five years after the "Atoms for Peace" speech by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, TRIGA® (acronym for Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics), a new inherently safe type reactor developed for nuclear research, training and isotope production, was conceived, built and operated at the General Atomic Division in San Diego. Over the years, the TRIGA industry has soon evolved into the most widely used research reactor in the world with operating power levels up to 14 MW and designs up to 25 MW. Since 1965 the Laboratory of Applied Nuclear Energy (LENA) of the University of Pavia has been operating a TRIGA research reactor with thermal power levels of 250 kW. The installation is used to support education and training programs, neutron activation analysis activities, medical research, industrial applications, and is mainly dedicated to applied nuclear science in general. These activities will be presented together with the historical and tee presented together with the historical and technical aspects of the Nuclear Research Reactor. The Centro Nazionale di Adroterapia Oncologica (CNAO) of Pavia is the only Italian structure capable of administering therapeutic radiotherapy treatments with heavy particles (carbon ions, protons) accelerated; in addition to this, it hosts significant research activity, both as basic research and for health-related applications. From the perspective of radioprotection, the most significant risk profile is that linked to external irradiation, from three categories of sources accelerated external beams (in addition to the treatment beams there are conventional linear accelerators), materials activated following irradiation during treatment or during research activities, unstable isotopes used for diagnostic purposes. The CNAO building has been designed and built to guarantee maximum safety both to the operator and to the patient or visitor, with widely redundant systems in order to exclude the occurrence of accidental irradiation, and to minimize the risk of exposure to activated materials. The cohort of worfic characteristics of the work process. The main critical issues related to the health surveillance of the exposed CNAO workers come from the energies used, with significant activation capacity, and from the presence of personnel in training. In the last few years a wide dissemination of hadrontherapy facilities is taking place. In these facilities, proton or heavy ion (mainly carbon) accelerators are used to treat cancers in peculiar positions (i.e. close to critical organs), or with peculiar biological features that make them not eligible for conventional radiation therapy with photons. During the design, the commissioning and the use of these facilities many radiation safety issues are to be addressed, that are different from the ones that the professionals in the field are used to facing. Many problems need to be solved, among which the characterization of the radiations fields produced by the accelerators, the shielding design, the design of the interlock systems, and the management of the activated materials (PE11). Both the personal and environmental dosimetry systems need to be set up and implemented, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the involved radiation fields, that are often made of many different high energy particles.